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Abstract The paper argues that both evolutionary and
genetic approaches to studying the biological foundations of
speech and language could benefit from fractionating the
problem at a finer grain, aiming not to map genetics to
“language”—or even subdomains of language such as
“phonology” or “syntax”—but rather to link genetic results
to component formal operations that underlie processing the
comprehension and production of linguistic representations.
Neuroanatomic and neurophysiological research suggests that
language processing is broken down in space (distributed
functional anatomy along concurrent pathways) and time
(concurrent processing on multiple time scales). These parallel
neuronal pathways and their local circuits form the infrastruc-
ture of speech and language and are the actual targets of
evolution/genetics. Therefore, investigating the mapping from
gene to brain circuit to linguistic phenotype at the level of
generic computational operations (subroutines actually exe-
cutable in these circuits) stands to provide a new perspective on
the biological foundations in the healthy and challenged brain.
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The empirical bases of the biology of language
The study of the biological foundations of speech and
language processing is a lively and controversial area of
research. Broadly speaking, there are three areas of biology
that are widely discussed: evolutionary biology (under
which one can include “evo devo” as well as comparative
ethology), genetics, and neurobiology. All these areas of
investigation are stimulating vigorous debate (e.g., Rice
1996, 1997; Pinker 1999; Jackendoff 2003; Chomsky 2007;
Larson et al. 2010; Fitch 2010; DiSciullo and Boeckx 2011;
Maggie and Gibson 2012). Notwithstanding the enthusiasm
for the questions and controversies, the empirical basis of
much of the research is relatively thin—at least if one is
looking at evolutionary biology and genetics. I outline some
of the challenges to empirical research below.
The empirical restrictions for evolutionary biology are
predictably complicated. The evolutionary biologist
Richard Lewontin has argued that because we do not have
access to earlier forms—at least with respect to overt,
measurable, and quantifiable behavior or output, since the
individuals are dead and their central nervous systems
inaccessible—basically all accounts remain post hoc narra-
tive interpretations of potential evolutionary scenarios,
often called “just so stories” borrowing from the author
Rudyard Kipling, totally unsatisfying from a mechanistic,
explanatory point of view (Lewontin 1998). The spectrum
of evolutionary scenarios that are entertained in this
literature is wide (e.g., we first imitated animal sounds, or
first made noises of cooperation, or first felt a need to
gossip about conspecifics, or social motivation drives
changes in the system, etc.), and the stories range from
the plausible to the charming to the ridiculous (in part
reviewed in Pinker and Bloom 1992; for current perspec-
tives, see Larson et al. 2010). Recent considerations from
evolutionary developmental biology provide a new angle
(Chomsky 2010); nevertheless, these are largely data about
structural properties of the biological system and structural
similarities across species—and we remain largely in the
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dark about what putatively early functional forms of
linguistic representation or communication did in fact look
like. This area of research holds significant promise, but
there are as yet no major results that one can point to as
foundational for an understanding of the foundations of
representation and computation in language.
A different angle on evolution, comparative ethology,
has a relatively rich body of data, namely the extensive
research on animal communication and cognition, but the
results remain puzzling (and often equally speculative) in
light of the system that is ultimately under investigation,
human speech and language processing. This work is, to be
sure, a potentially highly informative source of data on the
biological infrastructure underpinning the human system; in
particular, as researchers converge on what are the kinds of
questions about speech/language that one can plausibly
investigate in other species, this work will become
increasingly influential. For example, it stands to reason
that attributes of the input and output systems (i.e., sensory
and motor processing) can be profitably tested in nonhuman
preparations, on the view that much of the machinery is
highly conserved across evolution (e.g., Hauser 1998). On
the other hand, there are aspects of language processing that
appear highly idiosyncratic, and it is not at all obvious how
study of nonhuman species will inform us in this regard (for
example, the operations underlying inflectional and deriva-
tional morphology, the representation of structurally condi-
tioned long-distance relationships between reflexives and
their antecedents, the nature of the words/concepts that are
the “atoms” of language, and so on).
One strategy that has yielded results in comparative
ethological research is focused on identifying the inventory
of elementary operations underlying language processing.
Assuming (reasonably) that the broader domains we use to
talk about language processing (e.g., phonology, syntax,
semantics) can be decomposed into more elementary
operations (say, concatenation, labeling, construction of a
constituent; see Poeppel & Embick 2005), one can begin to
assess whether this inventory of elementary operations is
available, usable, and used in different animal species. (The
strategy to decompose language processing into elementary
subroutines is further discussed below.) That is to say,
perhaps we are not prepared (or interested) to attribute
“syntax” to some species, but we would not be offended to
characterize that animal as using, say, “concatenation” as an
elementary operation to link units. A concrete example of
research in this vein concerns recursion as a hypothesized
primitive computational operation (Hauser et al. 2002;
Fitch 2010). Similarly, research on the sensorimotor
foundations of speech has tested parallels between human
and animal systems.
In summary, the evolution of speech and language is
widely discussed and hotly debated, but the empirical basis
of the arguments remains problematic. One issue that has
been an obstacle to more rapid progress is that there is no
agreement on how to evaluate evolutionary hypotheses in
this context because there is serious disagreement about the
nature of the linguistic system itself. It is fair to say that the
vast majority of scholars assume that the system (the
“faculty of language”) is quintessentially designed for
communication. On this view, whatever parts make up the
language system (phonology, morphology, syntax, lexical
and compositional semantics), their major role is in the
service of communication. Therefore, precursors and
evolutionary scenarios are constructed with communica-
tion (a concept that itself is rather underspecified) as the
critical causal centerpiece. In contrast, some research
arising from a more linguistic theoretical tradition
(“biolinguistics”; for a recent perspective, see Chomsky
2007) does not presuppose that communication lies at the
core; rather, the computational and representational mental
inventory is considered to be the key question. What is the
“parts list” that forms the basis of the language system?
What are putatively language-specific (domain specific)
aspects (say morphology) and what aspects are arguably
generic and likely to be shared with other species (say a
long-term memory system)? On this kind of view, some of
the subroutines may be used for communication whereas
others may be serving other purposes (e.g., externalization
of thought). Language is used for communication—but
not necessarily “optimally designed” for this purpose.
Indeed, some parts may make it more ill-suited for
communication, e.g., the rampant ambiguity that exists
in virtually every aspect of language processing. Its
properties and quirks may derive from other aspects of
psychology, say being able to combine constituent
thoughts, generating new internal representations, etc.
(Chomsky 2000). It goes without saying that the con-
struction of alternative evolutionary scenarios is closely
linked to the underlying theories about the system itself,
and as a consequence, the hypotheses that have been
articulated differ sharply between scholars adopting such
different foundational perspectives, i.e., language as an
internal computational system that can be used for
communication versus language as a system evolved to
optimize communication. To adjudicate between these
options, one will want to consider the arguments for the
two theoretical positions as well as hope for a considerable
enrichment of the available evidence.
A different area of biological research in which the
empirical basis is steadily growing is genetics. A number of
papers in the special issue elegantly deal with the advances
in this domain. Just a few general remarks are in order, to
situate the work and motivate the perspective that is
outlined below. The toolboxes of genetics have been used
in different ways to study language. There is a small, albeit
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growing, amount of psycholinguistically motivated research
focused on twin and adoption studies (Stromswold 2001).
The bulk of the data, however, comes, predictably, from the
study of speech and language disorders, which offer a
useful entry point into genetic analyses. With regard to the
input and output systems, there is interesting research on
dyslexia and stuttering (e.g., Drayna, this volume, on
stuttering); with regard to more central language systems,
there is increasing interest in characterizing the genetics of
specific language impairment (Rice, this volume). These
areas of research are ably reviewed and discussed in the
papers. The question that is briefly raised here concerns the
relationship between potential results in genetic research
and the online representation and computation of speech
and language. Specifically, let us assume that the genetic
studies succeed perfectly and that we have available a
detailed map of the genetic foundations of the linguistic
phenotype. Something very foundational is missing for
causal models: an understanding of the actual circuits
executing the processing.
Genes do not speak; people do. In particular, it is “the
brain part of people” that does the speaking (and hearing,
comprehending, and interpreting…). Therefore, to begin to
have an explanatory understanding of how our genetic
makeup underlies the structural and functional properties at
the basis of speech and language—to have satisfying
mechanistic linking hypotheses between linguistic behavior
and its genetic foundations—the correlative data mediating
between genetics and linguistics (and psychology/cognitive
science, more generally) cannot do without an understand-
ing of how the genome/epigenome relates to the neuronal
circuitry that is the implementational infrastructure for
cognition. I take it to be the goal of this research direction
to provide a mapping from genetics to neural circuitry to
computational neuroscience to language processing.
Presumably, the yearning is to identify the genetic basis
of the specific neural circuits (on whatever microscopic,
mesoscopic, or macroscopic scale turns out to be
relevant) that in turn constitute the basis for the
operations that underpin speech and language, i.e., the
representations and computations that lie at the founda-
tion of the faculty of language.
The third area of biological inquiry, neurobiology, is
obviously closely related to evolutionary biology and
genetics—and inconceivable without these—but has a
more immediate available basis for testing hypotheses
about the relevant biological infrastructure. We now turn
to an—admittedly parochial—perspective on some cog-
nitive neuroscience foundations of speech perception
and language comprehension, with the goal of providing
examples of the kinds of circuits and operations that
both evolutionary theory and genetic characterization
ultimately must aim to capture.
Three ideas from the cognitive neuroscience of language
Here I briefly sketch three ideas that illustrate at what level
of analysis both evolutionary and genetic considerations
might be able to make some substantial progress. First, a
more up-to-date functional anatomy of language is briefly
presented. Second, some recent physiological data on
timing are summarized, highlighting their potential relation
to genetic work. Third, we discuss the problem of aligning
the analytic constituents of language research and neurobi-
ology: the granularity mismatch problem.
(a) The pathways of speech and language: functional
neuroanatomy
Until at least the late 1990s, consultation of a
textbook on neurology, neuropsychology, neurosci-
ence, linguistics, or any associated discipline showed
the “classical model” of the brain basis of language: on
a schematic of the left hemisphere were depicted
Broca's area in the left inferior frontal lobe and
Wernicke's area in the posterior superior temporal
lobe. Typically, the frontal area was associated with
aspects of production (and later, syntactic aspects of
language processing), and the temporal area was
associated with perception (and later, aspects of
meaning). The classical intuition—rather behaviorist
in nature in terms of its philosophical underpinning,
i.e., language processing is reflexive—was that the
input (speech) was taken in and processed in the
posterior areas and then shuttled forwards to
frontal areas for generating an output (production).
There was no notion of internal representation or
computation in any mentalistic context; rather, the
most sophisticated models, such as Wernicke's,
described the phenomena in terms of acoustic and
motor images of words that were related to each
other. It is now uncontroversial that this classical
model, while immensely useful historically especially in
a clinical context, is hopelessly underspecified
biologically as well as linguistically (Poeppel and
Hickok 2004). Experimental research deriving from
noninvasive recording (fMRI, PET, EEG, MEG) as
well as from patient research has enriched our
understanding of the anatomic basis of speech
perception and language comprehension and production.
There are many more cortical and subcortical regions
that we now know to play integral roles beyond the two
classically defined regions; both left and right
hemispheres are implicated across various tasks (e.g.,
voice recognition; lexical semantics), and the analyses of
what these various regions accomplish are now linked to
linguistics, psychology, computational neuroscience, and
other relevant approaches. Below I very briefly and
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superficially discuss a few examples that illustrate some
of the areas of progress.
One new model attempting to capture these recent
developments in neuroscience (in particular, data from
imaging) as well as in linguistics and psycholinguistics
postulates that there is a dual stream of information
processing (Hickok and Poeppel 2004, 2007). (A
related model that focuses on the analysis of meaning
also emphasizes concurrent pathways; Lau et al. 2008.)
Focusing on speech recognition, an incoming signal's
acoustic attributes are initially analyzed in the dorsal
and posterior superior temporal gyrus and superior
temporal sulcus. Importantly, these initial stages of
perceptual analysis are computed bilaterally in the
superior temporal cortex (Binder et al. 2000), although
the left and right cortical regions have important
computational specializations (especially with regard
to timing properties, as discussed in the next section)
that contribute differentially to perceptual analysis
(Hickok and Poeppel 2007; Poeppel et al. 2008).
Two processing streams then originate from early
cortical fields. A ventral pathway includes the superior
temporal sulcus, the anterior temporal lobe, the middle
temporal gyrus, inferior temporal sulcus, and perhaps
the inferior temporal gyrus. The ventral stream under-
lies the mapping from sensory/phonological representa-
tions to lexical or conceptual representations (i.e., from
sound to meaning). A dorsal pathway, including the
Sylvian parietotemporal area as well as the inferior
frontal gyrus, anterior insula, and premotor cortex,
provides the substrate for mapping from sensory/
phonological representations to articulatory-motor
representations. While early analysis is indisputably
bilateral and much of the processing in the ventral
stream is more bilateral than previously assumed
(Binder et al. 2000; Hickok and Poeppel 2007), the
dorsal pathway appears to be more left-lateralized. In
addition to positing multiple streams—as well as
multiple areas within each stream—it must now also
be acknowledged that each cortical region has fine-
grained subdivisions. As we know from the study of
visual areas, the laminar and columnar structure in
the cortex offers intricate micro-circuitry underlying
neural coding.
Adopting such a model has a variety of conse-
quences for discussing language processing. For
example, such a distributed functional anatomy of
speech processing proper suggests there must be a
representational format for speech sounds that
facilitates the rapid transformation between articulatory
and auditory coordinate systems. In other words, the
anatomy has strong implications for representational
theories. Furthermore, it is obviously a new kind of
research challenge to assign elementary functions or
computational subroutines to these independently
defined subregions. The research is not about assigning,
say, “syntax” or “phonology” to an entire cortical field.
Rather, it is taken for granted that successful language
processing is a consequence of the coordinated action of
these distributed elements; each contributes some
particular operation, and jointly they form the basis for
recognizing words, combining words to form phrases,
and so on. Finally, this kind of architecture lends itself
naturally to investigate both feedforward and feedback
processing, the interaction of which lies at the center of
most current theories of language processing. And, with
respect to the larger issue at stake, one can now formulate
hypotheses about the evolutionary trajectory of an
anatomic subregion and its putative functional role.
One can dissect the neural circuitry within a region and
ask what aspect of the genetic toolbox might yield the
observed anatomic cell and circuit structure. A particular
region and its function may be implicated only in
language processing or, alternatively, may show up in
the processing of other cognitive domains. Critically, the
functional anatomy reflects that the problem is spatially
decomposed into a number of subroutines. The quip that
“anatomy is destiny” should at least be taken seriously as
a research strategy in this domain of research. In the next
section, we turn to a similar strategy in the time domain,
breaking the processing problem down at different time
scales.
(b) Multi-time resolution processing
One of the fascinating challenges of perceptual
analysis is how to break the input stream—which comes
at a listener continuously (one might think of the arrow
of time)—into chunks of the appropriate size for further
processing. In the last 10 years, both behavioral and
neurophysiological research have revealed that processing
of this type happens on multiple timescales concurrently
(Poeppel 2001, 2003; Boemio et al. 2005; Giraud et al.
2007; Giraud and Poeppel 2012). By analogy to
breaking down the complex problem of language
representation and processing in space (by creating a
distributed functional anatomy with “localized expertise”
in different regions), we now have good reason to
conjecture that the perceptual system breaks the problem
down along multiple timescales that have natural
relations to the units of processing.
One model that has received some attention and
generated controversy, asymmetric sampling in time,
AST; Poeppel (2003) posits that the input stream is
sampled, simultaneously, at a relatively rapid rate
(approximately 25 to 50 Hz) and a significantly slower
rate (below 8 Hz). Such sampling over quite distinct time
scales would allow the processor to concurrently analyze
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syllabic/lexical information at one scale and much more
rapid segmental/phonemic information at the other. Both
the rationale and the empirical support for this model
have been reviewed extensively (Poeppel et al. 2008;
Giraud and Poeppel 2012), but recent research has begun
thinking about this multi-time resolution notion in the
context of genetic work. In particular, one of the more
provocative hypotheses suggests that a selective dys-
function of the circuits for slow versus fast sampling
could underlie deficits such as dyslexia. Interestingly,
both timescales have been separately implicated in
behavioral and genetic studies. On one hypothesis, a
selective dysfunction of the slow sampling scale leads to
phonological representations that are poorly mapped to
orthography, therefore leading to poor reading perfor-
mance (rise time hypothesis; Goswami 2010). An
alternative hypothesis argues that it is the compromised
rapid processing system that underlies dyslexic perfor-
mance. There is a long and complex history trying to
map elementary processing routines to language perfor-
mance. It is not yet clear how these theories will relate to
both linguistic theory and neurobiology. However, it is
encouraging that there exist new models that lend
themselves to extensive empirical testing, whether in
biological or genetic studies. The central message, again,
is that a system that breaks processing down in the time
domain offers a further, more granular view of what
constitutes the substrate for evolutionary change in what
might be a profitable target for genetic investigation. One
reason this area of research holds promise is that there
are clear possibilities for linking hypotheses across levels
of analysis, as was espoused at the outset. Recent
research using optogenetic techniques (e.g., Sohal et al.
2009; Cardin et al. 2009) has identified in great detail
how local cell types and circuits of a certain type
regulate gamma band activity, including for sensory
processing; this gamma band activity has been
hypothesized to be important for certain analyses
of speech (rapid sampling rate discussed above),
and these rates in turn have been suggested to
provide the basis for processing linguistic repre-
sentations of a particular grain size (segmental and
featural information). In short, the work in this
domain stands a chance of being able to relate
across levels genetics, the circuitry enabling spe-
cific computations, and the relevant cognitive
mechanisms. A research program that outlines
how oscillations mediate between spike trains at
one end and speech signals at the other is provided
in Giraud and Poeppel (2011).
(c) The granularity mismatch problem
We finally turn to the problem that lies at the very
center of cognitive neuroscience, and we ask how a
potential solution can inform both genetic research and
evolutionary theorizing. Suppose we ask a large
number of neuroscientists to define what are the
primitive elements (the “alphabet”) of neurobiology.
A long list will be generated of putatively elementary
units of anatomy and units of function. Presumably,
the list will include concepts such as neuron, synapse,
oscillation, long-term potentiation, etc. Then let us
repeat that exercise with a large cohort of language
researchers. There, the primitive elements will include,
arguably, concepts such as distinctive feature, syllable,
noun phrase, question formation, etc. Now, it is the
pretense of these fields of inquiry that there is a
mapping between the elementary constituents of
neurobiology and the elementary constituents of
cognitive science…. But if we are honest, it is quite
clear that we do not have the vaguest idea of how the
(empirically well-supported) elementary representa-
tions or processes from language (say distinctive
feature) map to the (well-supported) elementary
representations or processes from neuroscience (say
dendritic spine)! The fact of the matter is that the
mapping from the biological substrates to cognitive
representation and processing is simply not understood
at a satisfying level. In some sense, this is simply a
restatement of the philosophical mind–body problem.
In part, this problem comes from the fact that these
domains are studied at very different levels of
granularity. In linguistics, the concepts used to study
the knowledge of language one has as an adult
speaker/listener, its acquisition, and its processing are
exceedingly fine grained. In contrast, in cognitive
neuroscience research, the typical study seeks to
understand phenomena at the level of “where is
syntax.” This mismatch is not just practical—the
granularity mismatch problem—but also speaks to
the ontological commitments that different areas of
research make to what they take to be the set of
primitive elements (Poeppel and Embick 2005).
Is there a productive way forward? Clearly, we need
suitable linking hypotheses. These are, incidentally,
precisely the linking hypotheses that can potentially
provide quite different targets for investigation for
evolutionary theorizing and genetic experimentation.
What will such linking hypotheses look like, and how
can we begin to address the complicated relations
between the primitives of biology and the primitives of
cognitive science? In earlier work on this problem, it is
argued that linking hypotheses between speech/lan-
guage and brain are most likely to bear fruit if they
make use of computational analyses that appeal to
generic computational subroutines (Poeppel and
Embick 2005; Smolensky and Legendre 2006). The
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research strategy amounts to “radical conceptual
decomposition.” The recommendation is to take a
given domain of language processing, say word
recognition, and decompose it into elements that could
be plausibly mapped onto circuits that can be
instantiated in nervous tissue. Note that this is not an
exercise in reductionism as it is typically understood.
While the goal is indeed to determine the basic bits
and pieces, the goal is not simply to map what we take
to be linguistic primitives on to what we know to be
biologically available constituents (say something like
a mapping from word to neuron). In part, the problem
lies in the fact that we do not know what the mapping
should even be. For example, we have no reason to
believe that “syllable” maps on to dendrite, or neuron,
or ensemble, or cortical column, or some heretofore
unknown assembly of parts. Reduction is a sensible
game plan if the ontological structure of the underlying
domain is known, but I contend that neurobiological
“stuff,” too, is not yet understood at a level that licenses
reduction in the standard sense. So, broadly speaking, the
aim is to find generic representations/computations of the
sort that can at the same time be constitutive of a
linguistic representation or process and be a plausible
element that can be instantiated in a neuronal circuit.
The kinds of generic operations one might have in mind
here include concepts such as concatenation (take an X
and a Y and generate a chain X–Y) or linearization. A
different example might derived from the temporal
analyses discussed above, i.e., how does the circuitry
underlying gamma band responses related to the
hypotheses about gamma mediate analysis in speech.
There are interesting research programs going in these
directions, so future empirical work will show whether
this kind of strategy has legs.
Conclusion
There are few more fascinating scientific questions than
understanding the structure and function of the brain and
precisely how it forms the basis for human cognition. The
goal must be to develop an explanatory account, such that
the circuits that are identified and studied provide a causal
explanation for the representations and computations
deployed in language comprehension and production. At
the moment, it is fair to say that the research is by and large
correlative, not explanatory. In imaging studies, we identify
local brain activation and quantify the extent to which it
correlates with some language task. In genetic studies, we
correlate relatively broad patterns of the linguistic pheno-
type with genetic markers. In evolutionary studies, we
construct scenarios over broad categories of experience,
such as “syntax”—or even “communication.” The (admit-
tedly brief and caricature-ish) argument presented here
suggests that a more aggressive decomposition of these
concepts—specifically the putative primitives of neurobiol-
ogy and of language research—might provide a new and
unconventional view to study both evolution and genetics.
If the target of investigation is not a broad category such as
“syntax,” but a narrow category that is plausibly instanti-
ated in neural circuits such as, say, “concatenation” or
“rapid sampling,” then one can imagine constructing a
relatively narrow empirical test. Moreover, one could begin
to investigate in which way specific computational sub-
routines go wrong and lead to pathologies. There are some
notable efforts in this direction especially in the research on
specific language impairment (see, e.g., Rice, this volume).
Overall, what is advocated is no more than to “be a splitter,
not a lumper.” We now have excellent toolboxes to be
theoretically well motivated, computationally explicit, and
biologically plausible splitters (using the tools of linguis-
tics, computational neuroscience, neurobiology); if we end
up splitting into the appropriate granularity, it will provide
fresh new ground for evolutionary theories and genetic and
epigenetic characterization.
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